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Abstract 
Prior studies have shown that people are motivated to experience emotions that are congruent 
with their ideological convictions to justify their ideology. However, research has yet to identify 
whether differences in the motivation to experience ideology-congruent emotions persist beyond 
ideology-relevant targets of these emotions, or if these are limited to political targets. In this 
study (N = 193) we posited that left-right differences in the motivation to experience hope and 
fear, respectively, would be observed in response to both ideology-relevant and -irrelevant 
targets of these emotions, because they are seen as justifying one`s ideology. Our results were 
affirmative and suggested that, regardless of the ideological relevance of the emotions hope and 
fear, leftists were motivated to experience hope and rightists were motivated to experience fear, 
but not because this was seen as justifying their ideology. Notably, gender was found to correlate 
will all key-variables and decreased the significance of ideology in our results. The findings’ 
significance is discussed. 
Keywords: Emotion, Hope, Fear, Motivated Emotion Regulation, Ideology, Motivated 
Reasoning   
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During times of intergroup conflict wherein violent escalations are a common occurrence, 
one could naturally assume people would lose hope when faced with repeated and violent 
conflict-related stimuli. The results of the studies of Pliskin, Nabet, Jost, Tamir, and Halperin (in 
preparation) partly suggest the contrary and state that the desire to justify one’s ideological 
convictions can provide ample motivation to actually experience emotions that are congruent 
with the corresponding beliefs. In other words, leftists (more than rightists) believe hope justifies 
their political convictions and are therefore motivated to experience this emotion, even when 
confronted with repeated stimuli discouraging its occurrence and/or maintenance.  
While these results suggest that a belief that hope justifies leftist ideology will predict, to 
a certain extent, the motivation to experience that emotion in the context of intergroup-conflict 
and political events, they do not provide insight in whether or not differences in the motivation to 
experience ideology-congruent emotions to justify one’s ideology persist beyond ideology-
relevant targets of these emotions. In order to examine this proposition, we begin by reviewing 
relevant literature on ideology, followed by an examination of the emotions hope and fear, as 
well as integral and incidental emotions, the role of (motivated) emotion regulation, and lastly, 
we discuss ideology’s emotion-regulatory role of justifying one’s ideology in emotion regulation 
and its potential ability to generalize outside of intergroup-conflict and political events, building 
up to our hypotheses.  
Ideology 
The concept of ideology entails a wide-ranging set of beliefs, attitudes, ideas and/or 
values an individual, group or society can exhibit, and aims to provide a conceptual framework 
to navigate the world (Jost, Frederico, & Napier, 2009). Moreover, ideology as a construct is 
known to be relatively stable, changing only under specific instances such as repeated exposure 
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to new surroundings for a longer period of time (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008), or instances 
capable of producing conservative shifts (a psychological reaction to vulnerability) (Thorisdottir 
& Jost, 2011). Also, ideology is known for having cognitive as well as motivational underlying 
properties (Jost et al., 2009), with political leftism (liberalism) and rightism (conservatism) as 
different political ideologies distinguished according to variations in two core dimensions: 
support for or rejection of social change and inequality (Jost & Amodio, 2012). Additionally, 
both edges of the ideological spectrum (left-right) are known to be a useful approximation of the 
multidivergent political views and hold predictive validity for opinions on a diverse pallet of 
issues (Jost, 2009). 
The literature suggests that ideology plays a role in fulfilling relational, epistemic, and 
existential needs, according to the most salient need at that time, for a specific individual (Jost & 
Amodio, 2012). According to Hogg (2007), as well as many other scientists, a motivational 
tendency to maintain one’s ideology exists because needs are partially fulfilled by ideology. 
Moreover, a process wherein people engage to maintain their ideology is called ideologically-
motivated judgment. Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Huthchinson, and Chamberlin (2002) found that 
liberals and conservatives do not necessarily differ in their base-line regarding the personal 
attributions they make for the causes of social problems, but their ideologies will more likely 
start diverting when these attributions and judgments conflict with their ideological goals and/or 
values, which is called motivated correction. Another process which helps maintain ideology is 
motivated reasoning, which states that directional goals affect the attitudes and beliefs people 
hold, and that cognitive processes for accessing, constructing and evaluating those beliefs and 
attitudes are influenced by motivation, and consequently affect reasoning (Kunda, 1990). This 
process echo’s the outcomes of ideologically-motivated judgment regarding the motivation to 
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maintain ideology by helping people to arrive at desired conclusions. Recent studies also found 
that emotions play a part in maintaining one’s ideology (Pliskin et al, in preparation). Therefore, 
it is important to examine the literature regarding emotions. 
Emotions and Ideology 
 According to Frijda (2004), emotions are processes characterized by high mental activity 
which consciously or unconsciously involves cognitive appraisal and affect, and consequently 
also exhibits behavioral influences on individuals (Frijda, Manstead, & Bem, 2000) and groups. 
Regarding the latter, group-based emotions are emotions that are dependent on an individual’s 
identification with a group, and manifest in response to stimuli of perceived relevance to the 
group as a whole (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Emotions are known to influence attitudes 
and behaviors in a general setting (Frijda, 2004), as well as in a political context (Halperin, 
2016). Exposure to emotional stimuli translates to action readiness because of the emotional 
goals and appraisals the experience of emotions entails (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989).  
Central to our study are the group-based emotions hope and fear, which are known to be 
affective responses to the prospect of future activities, and symbolize appraisals of more positive 
or negative consequences, respectively, for these future events (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). 
Note, feelings of uncertainty are at least partially essential for one to experience hope or fear, and 
these emotions are always experienced in the present, but constitute a phenomenologically real 
affective response to change. In this regard, hope is generated when a belief exists that current 
circumstances should change in a positive way (Baumgartner, Pieters, & Bagozzi, 2008). This 
experience makes it possible to compare present circumstances with imagined future alternatives 
in combination with positive feelings about these alternatives (Staats & Stassen, 1985). 
Therefore, hope as an emotion brings positive feelings about the future in combination with 
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aspirations to change the circumstances of the present (Lazarus, 1991, 1999). Consequently, 
because hope allows for the imagining of a better future, groups which are involved in violent 
conflicts will be more likely to give greater consideration to creative solutions to the frictions at 
the core of the conflicts (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 2014). Moreover, hope has 
been found to increase the likelihood of forgiving the adversary (Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & 
Cains, 2005), or make one actively seek out new ideas and information (Cohen-Chen et al, 
2014).   
On the contrary, fear is experienced when one realizes an undesirable future event may 
be actualized (Lazarus, 1991). Accordingly, fear allows for the imagination of behavior that may 
help to avoid incoming danger (Baumgartner, Pieters, & Bagozzi, 2008). Indeed, ample research 
has shown that the experience of fear initiates danger-control strategies which positively 
influence attitudes, intentions and behavior (Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). For this reason, 
fear has been linked with avoidance motivation (Carver & Scheier, 2011), and with the pursuit of 
avoidance goals (Tamir, 2016). 
Since hope and fear are both highly related to change, a certain relationship between 
these emotions and ideology is likely to exist, as attitudes towards change are one of the two core 
dimensions differentiating political leftism and rightism (Jost & Amodio, 2012). Indeed, the 
studies of Pliskin and colleagues (in preparation) found a relationship between ideology and the 
motivation to experience hope or fear, because these emotions are seen as justifying one’s 
ideology. More specifically, leftists (more than rightists) are motivated to experience hope 
because this is seen as justifying their ideology, whereas rightists (more than leftists) are 
motivated to experience fear in order to justify their ideology. Importantly, these results were 
exclusively observed in political contexts, in other words, in response to ideology-relevant 
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targets of these emotions only (e.g. hope for a peaceful conflict-resolution, or fear for the 
escalation of a politically-laden negotiation). Such affective experiences whose sources stem 
directly from the stimuli at hand can be defined as integral emotions (Lowenstein & Lerner, 
2003). Incidental emotions, for that matter, are affective experiences whose sources are not 
related to the stimuli at hand. For instance, being angry at your spouse because your favorite 
soccer team just lost a match. This anger has nothing to do with your girlfriend, but still 
influences your behavior. Research on incidental emotions states that even though certain 
emotions do not stem from the context itself, they can still influence the task at hand (e.g. 
Razran, 1940; Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Isen, 1987). For example, Kausel and Connolly 
(2014) found that people hold specific beliefs about how incidental emotions affect 
trustworthiness, which consequently modified their behavior. Moreover, even when an emotion 
is aroused by incidental sources, corresponding emotional biases against certain groups may still 
be activated because of the already established resemblance between that emotion and that 
certain group (Dasgupta, DeSteno & Williams, 2009). So arguably, because incidental emotions 
also have an influence on attitudes and behavior, it makes sense that people may be motivated to 
experience them to justify their political beliefs. To further understand the potential role 
emotions (incidental and integral) have in justifying one’s ideology, and before finalizing the 
hypotheses, important literature regarding emotion regulation has to be examined next. 
Motivated Emotion Regulation 
 The process of influencing which emotion to feel, when and how much, is called emotion 
regulation, and is linked with well-being, mental health, cognitive functioning and social 
relationships (Gross, 2014). Before the initial process of emotional regulation, an individual 
needs to have one or more motives to fulfill a need (Tamir, 2016; Keltner & Gross, 1999). Put 
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differently, there must be a motivation to experience these emotions in line with an expected 
outcome such as the attainment of motives through emotional experience. Tamir (2016) suggests 
that these motives can be hedonic (i.e. wanting to increase pleasant emotions and decrease 
unpleasant ones), or instrumental, wherein emotions are experienced (or a motivation exists to 
experience them) to attain the perceived instrumental benefits of that emotion. Notably, the 
instrumental approach to emotion regulation does not state that the experienced emotions has to 
be pleasant, and/or serve short term hedonic goals. Instead it serves performance, epistemic (to 
know), eudaimonic (to be) and/or social motives.  
More recent studies suggest that a desire to justify an ideology may be a directional goal 
in the motivation to experience an emotion (Pliskin et al., in preparation). Thus, when leftists and 
rightists are confronted with uncertainty and change in a political (conflict-) situation wherein 
one could experience appraisals of hope and/or fear regarding future prospects, their respective 
ideologies are found to influence the experience of hope and fear, respectively. And whereas 
previous research of Cohen-Chen et al, (2014) indicated that leftists and rightist differ in their 
reactions to political stimuli because of their emotional reaction, Pliskin and colleagues (in 
preparation) added that these differences may actually stem from the belief that these emotions 
justify that ideology. In their samples, they have established that the belief that hope justifies 
ideology is more salient among leftists, whereas the believe that fear justifies ideology is more 
pronounced among rightists. The researchers expand these results and found out that leading 
people to believe that a certain emotion justifies their ideology (versus undermining it) will 
increase the experience of that emotion. Thus, leading leftists to believe hope justifies their 
ideology will make them experience more hope and increases their motivation to engage in 
activities to attain future goals, but only when the stimuli of the emotions are congruent with the 
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ideology and serve the goal of maintaining that ideology. What is not yet clear is whether 
ideology-congruent emotions such as hope and fear are also seen as justifying one’s ideology 
when experienced outside the context of politics. Another contribution to these findings would 
be a direct measure of motivation. Previous studies demonstrate that a desire to justify one’s 
ideology provides ample motivation to actually experience emotions, but they did not 
specifically measure the motivation to experience hope or fear.  
The Present Research 
 The present research seeks to find out whether ideological differences in the motivation 
to experience hope and fear to justify ideology persist beyond ideologically relevant targets of 
these emotions (incidental), or if these are limited to political targets of these emotions only 
(integral). This statement is based on relevant literature regarding the justification of ideology 
through the experience of ideology-congruent emotions (Pliskin et al, in preparation), as well as 
research on ideological differences at distinct stages of the emotional process, including emotion 
regulation (Pliskin, Halperin, Bart-Tal, & Sheppes, 2017). Our proposition was also based on 
literature about motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), and motivated emotion regulation (Tamir, 
2016). Lastly, studies on incidental emotions have been examined to find out whether hope and 
fear are also seen as justifying a leftist and rightist ideology, respectively, when these emotions 
are incidental, in other words, ideology-irrelevant targets of these emotions. 
 To answer our research question and specific hypotheses, we will examine left-right 
differences in the motivation to experience hope and fear in response to ideology-relevant and -
irrelevant targets of these emotions. To determine this motivation, we offer participants a choice 
to rank several article-headlines according to their perceived reading-desirability of the 
corresponding articles. This hierarchy of most to least interesting articles captures the preference, 
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to read one article above another, and the headlines either symbolize hope or fear regarding 
ideology-relevant or -irrelevant targets of these emotions. We expect to reproduce the results of 
(Pliskin et al, in preparation), namely, that leftists will be motivated to experience hope when 
confronted with ideology-relevant headlines, because this is seen as justifying their ideology and 
because it is supported by previous research. Likewise, we expect rightists to be motivated to 
experience fear when confronted with ideology-relevant headlines, because this is seen as 
justifying their ideology. We also expect our leftist participants to be motivated (more than 
rightist participants) to experience hope when presented with ideology-irrelevant article-
headlines, because this is also seen as justifying their ideology. Accordingly, we expect our 
rightist participants to be motivated (more than leftist participants) to experience fear when 
presented with ideology-irrelevant article-headlines, because this is seen as justifying their 
ideology. 
Method 
Participants 
 We have employed a two-wave study to make sure we would obtain a balanced sample of 
leftists, centrists and rightists. Additionally, we tried to avoid any demand characteristics by 
including self-report questionnaires measuring ideology in the first questionnaire and the 
behavioral measure that determined motivation in the second questionnaire. Our sample 
consisted of one hundred and ninety-three respondents (ages 18-78, M = 28.65, SD = 12.95), 
who completed the two-wave study in return for one course credit or €3.50. Participants 
completed the questionnaires either in the lab at the University of Leiden, online, or a 
combination of both. We decided to exclude seven participants because they had finished the 
general questionnaire within 300 seconds, which is unlikely if one wants to read all instructions 
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and questions. In the analyses below, we included all participants who answered up until the 
dependent variable that was included in the first part of the general questionnaire. Ultimately, the 
final sample consisted of one hundred and eighty-six participants (ages 18-78, M = 28.86, SD = 
13.14). The political orientation of this sample is similar to the political landscape of the 
Netherlands, with 38.7% of respondents identifying as moderately to extreme leftist, 31.7% 
identifying as centrist, and 29.6% as moderately to extreme rightist. 
 Notably, during the process of data gathering we found out that, unintendedly, we might 
have weakened our mask of the true aim of this study. We took measures to avoid demand 
characteristics by having two questionnaires and more than eight hours between completing the 
first questionnaire and starting the second. However, we identified 49 participants who did not 
have sufficient time in-between their responses on both questionnaires. Initial analyses indicated 
that the responses of these did not significantly differ from the rest of the sample. Therefore, we 
included these participants in the analyses we ran. As an extra measure, we created an additional 
filter variable to run analyses with and without these participants to specify small details were 
necessary. 
Procedure 
 The first questionnaire was either emailed to participants after they had scheduled the 
date of their participation. If they did not perform this questionnaire online, they would complete 
this first when arriving in the lab. The first questionnaire consisted of an information form, an 
informed consent form, and background, as well as demographic questions. These questions 
measured our moderator, ideology, and additional basic demographic data. 
 After the participants arrived in the lab, they completed the second questionnaire. If they 
did not come to the lab at all, they completed this questionnaire online. This questionnaire started 
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off by affirming the participants’ informed consent. Consequently, participants were led to 
believe that this study measured personal expressions when writing about one’s worldview. 
Participants were also told that reading articles on multiple subjects increases one’s rhetorical 
skills and general expression abilities. Thus, in order to have sufficient time for the entire study, 
participants were presented with several article-headlines which they had to rank according to 
their reading-desirability. The instructions ended by stating that ones all questionnaires were 
over, they would read this article, where after they ostensibly had to write about their worldview. 
The hierarchy of one’s categorized article-headlines served as our behavioral measure to 
determine the motivation to experience ideology-relevant and -irrelevant targets of hope and 
fear. This measure was pre-tested so we were confident that our participants would expect the 
corresponding headlines to be either hope-inducing or fear-inducing. Furthermore, we used a 
within-subject design and half of our participants saw only ideology-relevant hope and fear 
headlines, whilst the other half saw only ideology-irrelevant hope and fear headlines. 
 After the participants finished our measure for the main DV, they continued by answering 
several related measures for exploratory purposes, including, in this order, questionnaires for 
promotion focus and prevention focus, trait anxiety, intolerance of uncertainty, optimism and 
pessimism, adult trait hope, and scales for the evaluation of hope and fear in political and non-
political contexts. 
 Finally, participants were debriefed, and we explained that they did not have to read the 
articles, nor write a paragraph about their worldview, since this is not the real aim of our study. 
Measures 
 Our preliminary questionnaire measured demographic data including educational level, 
which was answered on a five-point scale (1 = high school; 5 = master’s degree or higher), 
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religiosity (1 = Atheist; 5 = very religious), and socio-economic status, that focused on the mean 
socio-economic status of a household in the Netherlands (1 = much lower than the mean; 5 = 
much higher than the mean). Importantly, due to human error, a measure to determine gender 
was left out of this questionnaire and collected later. Lastly, the initial questionnaire measured 
ideology based on the questions used in the studies of Pliskin and colleagues (in preparation), 
with three items (e.g. “On a left-right political spectrum, how would you defined your political 
orientation?”) on three dimensions (left-right, progressive-conservative, and economically- 
social-economically liberal), each with a seven-point scale (1 = extremely left, very progressive, 
and very social, respectively; 7 = extremely right, very conservative, and very liberal). To avoid 
raising suspicion about the true aim of the study, we included the questions about ideology in the 
middle of this questionnaire. Before analyses, we recoded ideology into three groups (1 = leftists, 
2 = centrists, 3 = rightists). 
 The motivation to read hope or fear inducing articles in response to ideology-relevant and 
-irrelevant targets of these emotions (i.e. ranking of the article-headlines) was measured using a 
six-point scale, wherein a score of 1 indicated the highest reading desirability, and 6 the lowest. 
As a result of random assignments of ideology-relevant and -irrelevant article-headlines, we 
distinguished two groups (1 = ideology-relevant, 2 = ideology-irrelevant), to check whether this 
dichotomy significantly impacted the experience of emotions to justify ideology. Before analysis 
we reverse-coded all the scores so that high scores indicated a high motivation to experience 
these emotions. Four different categories with each three different article-headlines captured the 
motivation to experience hope or fear by reading the corresponding article, namely, the category 
of ideology-relevant hope (e.g. ‘Predictions show that in the next decennia, immigrants will 
significantly contribute to the economic growth in the Netherlands’), the category for ideology-
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irrelevant targets of hope (e.g. ‘The Netherlands is close to receiving the title of happiest country 
in Europe’). A category for ideology-relevant fear (e.g. ‘Police: crime-rates will most likely 
increase in 2018’), and lastly, the category for ideology-irrelevant fear (e.g. ‘The Netherlands is 
close to the burst of an economic bubble, experts say’). We computed four different mean scores 
for each category by adding all scores (1-6) of that category that leftists, centrist, and rightists 
scored and divided them by N of the subgroup. We also calculated mean scores to determine the 
motivation to experience hope or fear without specifying ideological relevancy (adding all scores 
for the motivation to experience hope or fear and dividing them by the N of leftists, centrists, and 
rightists). The means for ‘preference for hope over fear’ or ‘preference for fear over hope’ were 
identical because we used a complimentary questionnaire. 
 To measure the control variable promotion and prevention focus, we used the 
questionnaire from Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Ison, Ayduk, and Taylor (2001), that focused on 
achievement orientations from subjective successful histories: promotion pride versus prevention 
pride. This questionnaire consisted of 11 items, with three different answering scales. Questions 
1-8 (e.g. “Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life?”), 
were answered on a five-point scale (1 = never or seldom; 5 = very often). Question 9 (“When it 
comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t perform as well as I ideally 
would like to do”), was also answered on a five-point scale (1 = never true; 5 = very often true. 
Lastly, questions 10 and 11 (e.g. “I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my 
life”) were answered on a five-point scale (1 = certainly false; 5 = certainly true). The promotion 
focus subscale consisted of questions 1, 3, 7, 9, 10 and 11. Before analyses we recoded items 1, 9 
and 11, and computed a mean score for this scale. The internal consistency was sufficient, 
Cronbach’s α = .67. The prevention focus subscale included items 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8. Before 
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analyses, items 2, 4, 6, and 8 were recoded. A mean score was also computed for this subscale. 
The internal consistency was good Cronbach’s α = .81. 
 The control variable trait anxiety was measured with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI) (Roberts, 2013). The STAI consisted of 6 items (i.e. “I feel nervous and restless”), which 
were answered on a 4-point scale (1 = almost never; 4 = very much so). Before analyses, we 
computed a mean score for this scale, which exhibited a good internal consistency Cronbach’s α 
= .87. 
 The intolerance of uncertainty scale (Buhr & Dugas, 2002) measured implications about 
uncertainty, attempts to control the future, and multidimensional (emotional, cognitive, and 
behavioral) reactions to equivocal contexts. This scale, modified by Fialko, Bolton, and Perrin 
(2015) used 5 items (i.e. “Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life”) that were answered on a 
five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Before analyses we computed a mean 
score for this scale. The internal consistency proved to be high, Cronbach’s α = .85. 
 To measure optimism and pessimism we used a ten-item scale (1 = totally disagree; 5 = 
totally agree) (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 2014). Item 1, 4, and 10 (e.g. “In uncertain times, I 
normally expect the best”) formed the optimism subscale. Before analyses we computed a mean 
score. The internal consistency of this scale was sufficient, Cronbach’s α = .63. Item 3, 7, and 9 
(e.g. “If something can go wrong, it will.”) made up the pessimism subscale. Before we ran 
analyses, we computed a mean score for this subscale too. The internal consistency was again 
sufficient, Cronbach’s α = .65. 
 According to Snyder (2000), adult trait hope can be measured using the adult hope scale 
(AHS). This scale can be divided into two subscales that symbolize Snyder’s cognitive model of 
hope: (a) Agency (e.g. goal-directed energy) and (2) Pathways (e.g. the planning of 
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accomplishing goals), or this scale can be used as one overall hope score. The 12 items (i.e. “I 
can think of many ways to get out of a jam”), were answered on an 8-point scale (1 = Definitely 
False; 8 = Definitely True). We decided to use one overall hope indicator, and reverse coded 
items 3, 5, 7, and 11. Before analyses we computed a mean score for this scale, which had a good 
internal consistency, Cronbach’s α = .81. 
 Participant’s evaluation of the emotions hope and fear in general, and in political 
contexts, was measured with several eight-point scales, wherein a 1 indicates a negative 
description (bad, harmful, foolish, useless, unnecessary), and a score of 8 a positive description 
(good, useful, wise, valuable, necessary), respectively. The evaluation of hope in general 
subscale consisted of item 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 (e.g. “fear is” 1 = bad, 8 = good). The internal 
consistency was excellent, Cronbach’s α = .92. The evaluation of fear in general subscale 
consisted of items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The internal consistency was good, Cronbach’s α = .85. The 
evaluation of hope in a political context subscale consisted of items 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20. The 
internal consistency was excellent, Cronbach’s α = .90. Finally, the evaluation of fear in a 
political context subscale consisted of items 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16. The internal consistency 
approached excellence, Cronbach’s α = .89. Before we analyzed these subscales, we computed 
four different mean scores, one for every scale (Netzer, Kim, and Tamir, 2015). 
 The questionnaires above regarding promotion and prevention focus, trait anxiety, 
intolerance of uncertainty, optimism/pessimism, adult trait hope and the evaluation of the 
emotions hope and fear in response to ideology-relevant and -irrelevant targets of these 
emotions, where included for exploratory purposes only. 
To measure whether the participants felt that their emotional experiences justified their 
political ideology, we used a modified version of the justification questionnaires that were used 
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in the studies of Pliskin and colleagues (in preparation). This questionnaire consisted of eight 
items, which were answered using a six-point scale (1 = completely disagree; 6 = completely 
agree). Items 1, 3, 5, and 7 measured the justification of ideology through the experience of hope 
(i.e. “Feeling hopeful about politics justifies my political beliefs”), this subscale had a good 
internal consistency, Cronbach’s α = .86. Item 2, 4, 6, and 8 measured the justification of 
ideology through fear (i.e. “Feeling fearful in general justifies my political ideology”). The 
internal consistency was good, Cronbach’s α = .86. Before analyses we computed mean scores 
for each subscale. 
Results 
We examined a bivariate correlation-matrix to explore the relationship between the 
central variables, demographic variables and control variables (Table 1). Regarding the latter, we 
choose to include the variables adult trait hope and trait anxiety, as well as optimism and 
pessimism, because of the emotional congruence with our article-ranking measure. We also 
included the intolerance of uncertainty variable because support for or rejection of social change 
is one of the two core components distinguishing leftism and rightism (Jost & Amodio, 2012), 
and change is always accompanied with uncertainty (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988).  
This overview showed that rightist ideology was negatively correlated with the 
preference for hope over fear. Accordingly, rightist ideology was negatively correlated with the 
belief that hope justifies ideology, and also, surprisingly, negatively correlated with the belief 
that fear justifies ideology. The control variables trait anxiety, intolerance of uncertainty, and 
pessimism showed a negative relationship with rightist ideology, whilst the control variables 
adult trait hope and optimism were positively correlated with rightist ideology. Interestingly, out 
of all demographic and control variables, gender was the only variable that correlated with the 
EXPERIENCING GENERAL HOPE (OR FEAR) TO JUSTIFY IDEOLOGY 18 
 
dependent variables for the overall preferences for hope and fear, while also being correlated 
with all other variables except hope justifies ideology. 
Effects of political relevancy and ideology on overall preference for hope and fear 
 We investigated the mean rankings for four different types of article-headlines (Figure 1), 
showing the identical pattern we found for the preference for hope- and fear-inducing articles in 
response to both ideology-relevant and -irrelevant targets of these emotions. More specifically, 
the mean scores for the overall preference for hope-inducing articles in response to ideology-
relevant targets (M = 3.79, SD = .76), as well as in response to an ideology-irrelevant target (M = 
3.71, SD = .78), were higher than the mean scores for the preference for fear-inducing articles in 
response to ideological-relevant targets (M = 3.21, SD = .76), and ideology-irrelevant targets (M 
= 3.29, SD = .78). 
To investigate whether leftists and rightists showed a greater preference for hope and fear 
inducing articles, respectively, in response to ideology-relevant and -irrelevant targets, we 
conducted a univariate analysis of variance with political ideology (left, center, right) and 
relevancy-condition (ideology-relevant and -irrelevant article-headlines) as independent 
variables, and overall preference for hope as the dependent variable. A statistically significant 
relationship was found for political ideology, F(2, 180) = 4.820, p = .009, η2 = .051. A post hoc 
Tukey revealed that the significance was only visible when comparing leftists (M = 3.95, SD = 
.09) with rightists (M = 3.53, SD = .10) (p = .007). Not when comparing centrists (M = 3.73, SD 
= .1) with leftists (p = .234), or rightists (p = .352). Moreover, the relevancy condition showed a 
non-significant relationship, F(1, 180) = .650, p = .421, as well as the interaction between 
condition and political ideology, F(2, 180) = .043, p = .958. These results were affirmative of our 
hypothesis since leftists’ preference for hope was not moderated by political-relevance. As for 
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rightists and the preference for fear over hope, we obtained an identical pattern because our 
behavioral measure to examine the motivation to read hope- or fear-inducing article was 
measured on the same spectrum, thus completing each other.  After the exclusion of 49 
participants who did not have sufficient time between the first questionnaire and the second (N = 
137, none of the results above changed significantly. 
We did not analyse whether differences in the motivation to experience hope- or fear-
inducing articles were experienced to justify one’s ideology, as one of the conditions for a 
mediation was not met, namely a correlation between the mediator and the dependent variable. 
Both hope justifies rightist ideology and fear justifies rightist ideology were negatively correlated 
with ideology. However, these correlations are not significant. 
We repeated the univariate analysis with the overall preference for hope as dependent 
variable, and political ideology and relevancy condition as independent variables, whilst adding 
gender as covariate. The results indicated that, while still maintaining the general trend, ideology 
was no longer a significant predictor for the overall preference for hope, F(2,179) = 2.017, p = 
.136. The relevancy condition was still not significant (p = .421), nor was the interaction between 
ideology and the relevancy condition (p = .958). Gender, on the other hand, was the only 
significant predictor for the overall preference for hope, F(1, 179) = 9.106, p = .003. 
Exploratory analysis with gender 
The relationship between ideology and the measured variables adult trait hope, trait 
anxiety, optimism, and intolerance of uncertainty was significant in all cases (all p < .05), 
although, after adding gender as a covariate, all significant correlations disappeared, except the 
relation between ideology and trait anxiety, F(2, 180) = 3.652, p = .028, η2 = .038. 
Discussion 
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Hypotheses and results 
Our objective was to determine whether the motivation to experience hope or fear to 
justify ideology persist beyond ideologically-relevant targets of these emotions, or if these 
processes are limited to ideology-relevant stimuli only. To this end, we employed a behavioral 
measure to determine the motivation to experience hope- and fear-inducing articles and used this 
as our dependent variables. To distinguish between ideology-relevant and -irrelevant stimuli of 
our emotions, we subjected half of our participant to politically-relevant targets of hope and fear, 
whilst the other half was subjected to politically-irrelevant targets.  
  First, we hypothesized that a leftist and rightist ideology would significantly predict the 
overall motivation to experience hope or fear, respectively, regardless of the political-relevancy 
of the article-headlines. Our results indicated that ideology was a significant predictor for the 
overall motivation to experience emotions while the relevancy-condition and the interaction 
between ideology and relevancy-condition was not. Thus, in response to both politically-relevant 
and politically-irrelevant targets of hope and fear, leftists showed the highest preference to read 
hope-inducing articles, whereas rightist exhibited the highest preference to read fear-inducing 
articles across conditions.  
Second, we predicted that the above results would be mediated by the belief that 
emotions justify ideology. Our data did not support this prediction as none of the variables 
measuring justification correlated with the dependent variables. Interestingly, ideology was 
significant and negatively correlated with both measures of justification, thus, leftists believed 
hope justified their ideology, whilst leftist also believed fear justified ideology. This is not in line 
with earlier results indicating that rightist, instead of leftists. believed fear justified their 
ideology. This pattern may exist simply because we compared our Dutch sample with samples 
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from The United States and Israeli, which were used in the studies of Pliskin et al., (in 
preparation).  
Third, we did not expect any of the demographic variables to significantly alter our 
findings. Contrary to our expectations, current results indicated that adding gender as a covariate 
decreases all of our main results, wherein ideology does not significantly predict the overall 
experience for hope or fear anymore. In the studies of Pliskin et al., (in preparation), gender was 
not significantly correlated with any measure, in any study, so we did not have a legitimate 
reason to believe that gender would have any (significant) correlations. 
Theoretical significance 
Our first contribution holds significance for the literature on ideology, motivated 
reasoning, and emotion-regulation. More specifically, we examined whether left-right 
differences in the motivation to experience hope and fear in response to ideology-relevant targets 
of these emotions to justify ideology, partially holds true in response to ideology-irrelevant 
targets as well. These results also contribute to the literature on incidental emotions (e.g. Kausel 
and Connolly, 2014; Dasgupta et al., 2009), which states that someone can be influenced by 
emotions that are no directly linked to the stimuli at hand. In our study, leftists and rightists were 
found to prefer hope- and fear-inducing articles, respectively, also when responding to incidental 
emotions. Put differently, it may be that incidental emotions may also serve to justify one’s 
ideology. 
 Regarding the belief that hope and fear justify ideology, different nationalities and/or 
cultures may differ in their belief that hope and fear justify ideology, and whilst this proposition 
has not (yet) been explicitly established before, other studies stated for example that European 
countries exhibit a stronger and negative relationship with in-equality and happiness, than the 
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United states (Alesina, Di Tella, & MacCulloch, 2004), so if these differences exist in the way 
that European countries react differently to in-equality (also an important factor differentiating 
leftism and rightism) and a positive feeling (happiness), it is not unlikely that national/cultural 
differences in the belief that hope and fear justify ideology also exist. Moreover, the Netherlands 
is known for having a political landscape that often leans to the center, whilst the other two 
countries are far more extreme when it comes to political ideology (and possibly the emotional 
experiences it may entail). This might also have contributed to the absence of justifying one’s 
ideology because hope and fear are positive and negative reactions, respectively, to change. If 
people are more centrist, it may be that they do not experience this process as intense.  
 As for gender and its’ significant correlations with all key-variables, a possible 
explanation for these unique findings might be provided partially by the concept of ‘gender gaps’ 
in political ideology (Norrander & Wilcox, 2008). First, the researchers stated that over the past 
few decades, men slowly thrifted from liberalism to conservatism, while only a portion of 
women did. The other portion of women felt free to identify (more) with liberalism. Thus, they 
concluded that a gender gap in ideology encompasses differences in men and women, as well as 
clear distinctions within the category of women alone. Secondly, single and well-educated 
woman have always been more liberal than their lesser educated and married counterparts, and 
these demographic variables among women are increasingly omnipresent. Thus, liberal women 
seem to have different interactions with ideology for which we did not take appropriate 
preparatory measures. Consequently, our sample consisted of 57.5% females, while the leftist’s 
category consisted of 72.2% females. Additionally, leftists were significantly higher educated 
than centrists, with women exhibiting the highest mean score for educational level in the leftist 
category (although not significantly). These data indicated that our sample consists of a 
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disproportionate amount of (very) liberal woman of whom many were highly educated (M = 
3,23, SD = .11) on a scale of 1 to 5, which consequently may have affected our results. To 
conclude, these findings suggest that woman want to experience hope while men prefer fear, and 
this pattern increases if woman are highly educated. 
Ultimately, when examining the relationship between ideology and the measured 
variables adult trait hope, trait anxiety, optimism, and intolerance of uncertainty we found 
significant correlations for all of these variables. But, after adding gender as a covariate, all 
significant relationships disappeared, whilst gender became a significant predictor for all 
variables, except for one. The control variable trait anxiety maintains a significant relationship 
with ideology, even when gender is added as a covariate. Interestingly, leftists had the highest 
mean score for trait anxiety, followed by centrists, and rightists, respectively. Although these 
results were not important for our main hypothesis, they were still surprising. Rightists are 
usually found to be motivated to experience fear, thus, we assumed they would also score higher 
on the trait anxiety scale. This was not the case in our sample, and these findings may be 
partially understood with literature on the ‘happiness gap’, which states that conservatives are 
happier than liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008). Although trait anxiety and happiness are far from 
identical, these emotions belong to categories which constitute two opposites and shows that 
conservatives are linked with positive emotions as well, whilst liberals sometimes tend to 
experience less positive (negative) feelings, such as more trait anxiety in this case, than rightists.  
Limitations and further directions 
 The sample used in our research forms a central limitation. Although we did obtain a 
politically balanced sample, we did not manage to maintain this balance when taking into 
account gender and educational level. Because of this, we had to deal with an overrepresented 
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number of highly-educated leftist woman, and at least in our study, this subgroup showed a 
strong correlation with the motivation to experience hope. Future research should balance their 
participant samples according to political ideology, as well as gender and educational level. In 
other words, it is important that the amount of men and woman across leftists, centrists, and 
rightists is near equal, as well as exhibit an approximately identical mean educational level. This 
way, one can make sure that the results are not confounded by gender or educational level. 
Another possible limitation of this sample consists of the fact that our sample was 
completely Dutch, while comparing our results with prior studies using participants from the 
USA and Israel. As a consequence, national or cultural differences between citizens of the USA, 
Israel, or the Netherlands might have been the reason why we did not find a significant 
relationship of the belief that hope and fear justify ideology and the motivation to experience 
these emotions. Future research could specifically look at national or cultural differences in the 
belief that hope and fear justify ideology, for example by comparing only samples from the 
USA, or use mixed samples. Only then is it possible to better understand if left-right differences 
in the motivation to experience ideology-relevant and -irrelevant targets of these emotions to 
justify one’s ideology is limited to ideology-relevant targets of these emotions.  
Conclusion 
This study found affirmative results for the hypothesis that left-right differences in the 
motivation to experience hope and fear to justify one’s ideology in response to ideology-relevant 
targets of these emotions, would generalize to ideology-irrelevant targets of hope and fear as 
well. Future studies should expand these results by determining whether these motivational 
differences were actually the result of the belief that hope or fear justifies one’s ideology. 
Moreover, to increase the generalizability of our results, future researchers may examine left-
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right differences in the motivation to experience ideology-incongruent emotions (less related to 
future change, such as anger), to justify their ideology.  
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations Among key-variables. = 
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  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.  Ideology  
(1 = Left, 3 = 
Right) 
1.91 .82 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. Overall Hope 
Preference 
3.75 .77 -.22** 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  Overall Fear 
Preference 
3.25 .77 .22** -1.00** 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
4. Hope justifies 
ideology 
3.56 .95 -.22** .02 -.02 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
5. Fear justifies 
ideology 
2.92 1 -.23** .00 0 .26** 1 - - - - - - - - - 
6. Adult Trait 
Hope 
5.63 .91 .23** -.05 .05 .01 -.12 1 - - - - - - - - 
7. Trait Anxiety  1.92 .68 -.25** .03 -.03 .05 .11 -.64** 1 - - - - - - - 
8. Optimism 
scale 
3.49 .69 .26** -.08 .08 .09 0 .61** -.54** 1 - - - - - - 
9. Pessimism 
scale 
2.49 .71 -.17* -.09 .09 -.1 .2** -.51** .47** -.47** 1 - - - - - 
10. Intolerance of 
Uncertainty 
2.08 .81 -.21** .02 -.02 .17* .16* -.48** .57** -.36** .38** 1 - - - - 
11. Age 28.86 13.14 .11 -.06 .06 -.01 -.1 .09 -.23** .12 -.17** -.07 1 - - - 
12. Gender - - .37** -.27** .27** -.1 -.2** .35** -.28** .34** -.26** -.2** .17* 1 - - 
13. Education 3.24 1.13 -.03 .09 -.09 0 -.07 .15* .09 .06 -.04 0 -.27** .01 1 - 
14.  Religiosity 2.15 1 -.06 -.08 .08 .1 0 -.08 .04 -.07 -.03 .18** .07 -.15* -.11 1 
15. Income 2.50 1.26 .07 -.05 .05 .07 -.07 .1 -.14 .1 -.12 .04 .19** .02 -.17* .08 
                  
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
  
 
Figure 1. Means for the preference for article-headlines in four categories 
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